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Workmen's Compensation-1962 Tennessee
Survey
I. Gilmer Bowman, Jr.*
I. SCOPE OF COVERAGE
II. INJURY BY ACCIDENT ARIsING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
A. Injury by Accident
B. Injury by Accident Arising Out of Employment
C. Injury by Accident in the Course of Employment
III. ExrENr OF INJURY
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
V. COMPUTATION OF BENEFITS
The Tennessee Supreme Court was again faced with a substantial
number of workmen's compensation cases during the current survey
year. Fewer of the cases than usual were concerned primarily with
whether the decision below was supported by sufficient evidence.
However, a number of them were illustrative of aspects of the statu-
tory requirement that an employee suffer an injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of his employment in order to be eligible for
workmen's compensation benefits.
I. SCOPE OF COVERAGE
Three cases decided during the survey year involved the question
of whether the injured employee was covered by, and restricted to an
action under, the workmen's compensation statute. In Commercial
Insurance Co. v. Young,' the employer had only three employees and
therefore was not presumed to have accepted the provisions of the
statute. However, the employer had taken a workmen's compensation
insurance policy from the insurance company and had paid the re-
quired premium. The policy made the insurance company liable to
employees for worknen's compensation benefits as provided for by
*Office of the General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of
any department or agency of the United States Government.
1. 209 Tenn. 608, 354 S.W.2d 779 (1962).
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statute, and the premium had been determined on the basis of the
estimated total annual remuneration of the employer's employees.
The plaintiff sustained a work-connected accident 37 days after the
effective date of the policy. Her employer told her that a workmen's
compensation insurance policy was in effect, and she brought suit
against both her employer and the insurance company. The lower
court gave her an award against both, and the Tennessee Supreme
Court affirmed the award. The insurance company contended, inter
alia, that it was not liable because the employer had not properly
manifested acceptance of the provisions of the statute. Section 50-906
of the Tennessee Code provides:
Employments not covered-Election of coverage-Revocation of Election.-
The Workmen's Compensation Law shall not apply to:
(d) In cases where less than five (5) persons are regularly employed, pro-
vided, however, that in such cases the employer may accept the provisions
of this law by filing written notice thereof with said Division of Workmen's
Compensation at least thirty (30) days before the happening of any acci-
dent or death, and may at any time withdraw the acceptance by giving like
notice of withdrawal.
The insurer argued that since the employer had not given notice of
acceptance to the Division of Workmen's Compensation, no liability
for the injury accrued. However, both the employer and the insurer
had given the Division of Workmen's Compensation written notice of
the injury, and the court found that the employer had intended and
desired to accept coverage under the statute. The court stated:
It will be noticed that the section provides that the employer may ac-
cept the provision of this law by filing written notice thereof with said
division of the workmen's compensation at least thirty (30) days before the
happening of any accident or death. This section does not prohibit the
employer from accepting the provisions of this Act immediately without hav-
ing to wait for the expiration of the thirty day period. It seems logical to
us to hold that the thirty day period was allowed to an employer in order
that it might procure the necessary insurance or furnish satisfactory proof
of its financial ability to pay claims that might arise against it under said
law as required under Section 50-1205 T.C.A.
2
In its original opinion, subsequently withdrawn, the court had held
that section 50-1205 was permissive rather than exclusive and that
an employer was not prohibited from accepting the provisions of the
statute "by other means or methods."3 In its final opinion, the court
stated: "The law will not permit the collection of a premium for
2. Id. at 621, 354 S.W.2d at 785.
3. 354 S.W.2d at 783 (advance sheet edition).
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insurance without exposure to risk."4 The decision appears to be a
reasonable interpretation of the statute and consonant with prece-
dent.
6
In Pigg v. Stacey,7 the trial court had sustained a demurrer to a
common law action for damages against an employer for the wrongful
death of an employee who was killed on May 2, 1960. The employee
was 18 years old at the time of his death and allegedly was illegally
employed. The plaintiff also alleged that he had an election either
to seek common law damages or workmen's compensation. Section
50-908(b) of the Tennessee Code defines "employee" to include a
minor whether lawfully or unlawfully employed. However, that pro-
vision did not become effective until March 10, 1961 after the death
of the employee. The supreme court held the amendment to be a
substantive provision, rather than one involving a matter of remedy,
and declared it prospective in operation. Therefore, the court re-
versed the decision below and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings since prior to the 1961 amendment an illegally employed minor
had an election as to whether to seek damages at common law or
workmen's compensation for a work-connected injury.8
Cradic v. Eastman Kodak Co.9 also involved a common law action
for damages suffered by an employee as the result of a work-con-
nected injury. However, the question presented in the federal district
court action was whether the employee was a "loaned employee" so
as to limit him to an action for workmen's compensation. Eastman
Kodak had leased a piece of equipment from a company, and the
company had supplied the plaintiff, one of its employees, to operate
the equipment. According to the lease, and in fact, Eastman Kodak
had the right to direct and control the details of the work, and at the
time of the injury, the employee was operating the equipment on
Eastman Kodak's premises. The federal court dismissed the case on
the ground that the employee was a 'loaned" or "borrowed" em-
ployee and therefore restricted to any remedy under the Tennessee
workmen's compensation statute to which he might be entitled. The
court held: 10
The prime test which is determinative of the issue is: "In whose work was
the employee engaged at the time; i.e., whose work was being done"?
4. 209 Tenn. at 624, 354 S.W.2d at 786.
5. The court also held that the plaintiff-employee had the burden of proving that
the employer had elected to accept coverage under the statute. Id. at 629, 354 S.W.2d.
at 788.
6. See Woods v. City of La Follette, 185 Tenn. 655, 207 S.W.2d 572 (1947).
7. 356 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1962).
8. American Sur. Co. v. City of Clarksville, 204 Tenn. 67, 315 S.W.2d 509 (1958).
9. 202 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), 30 TENN. L. REv. 287 (1963).
10. 202 F. Supp. at 591.
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Owen v. St. Louis Spring Co., 175 Tenn. 543, 136 S.W.2d 498, 499; Gaston
v. Sharpe, 179 Tenn. 609, 613, 168 S.W.2d 784. Stated another way:
"* * =At law, the well known test of the existence of the relationship of
master and servant is whether the employer has the right or duty of
directing the employee as to the details of his employment and when, as
here, the question is in an action for negligent injury, the test of the em-
ployer's liability is whether it was his duty to instruct and direct the servant
in the details of the particular 'means' or 'method' of employment, out of
which the injury arose. Texas Co. v. Bryant, Com'r., 178 Tenn. 1, 152
S.W.2d 627"; The Tennessee Supreme Court " * * has applied this
principle, which is universally accepted, to the settlement of questions in-
volving loaned servants' in a number of cases." McDonald v. Dunn Const.
Co., Inc., supra, 182 Tenn. 213, pp. 220, 221, 185 S.W.2d 517, p. 520.
Terry v. Memphis Stone and Gravel Co., 6 Cir., 222 F.2d 652, 653.
Since the court also found that Eastman Kodak had hired the
employee as well as the equipment, the decision would appear to be
in accord with the majority rule." Although the court indicated that
the employee could maintain a compensation action against either
Eastman Kodak, the special employer, or against the lessor company,
the general employer, the law in Tennessee appears to be that if an
employee is found to be a "loaned" or "borrowed" employee, the
general employer's compensation liability is suspended until the em-
ployee is returned.'2 However, the court's statements on that point
were dicta.
II. INJURY BY ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF AND IN =m COURSE
OF EmPLOYMENT
An employee covered by the statute must sustain an "injury by
accident:' "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment in order
to recover workmen's compensation. "Arising out of" is an expression
relating to the causal connection which must exist between the em-
ployment (including its nature, conditions, obligations, and incidents)
and the injury. Thus, the injury must be rationally connected with
the work by something more than mere coincidence. "In the course
of" is a phrase which requires consideration of whether or not an
injury is reasonably incident to the employment in terms of the time,
place, and conduct of the employee when the accident occurs. How-
ever, the two expressions are merely two parts of a single test. The
principal question in approximately half of the cases decided during
the current survey year concerned "injury by accident," "arising out
of," or "in the course of."
11. 1 LAnSON, WOnxMMN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 48.00 (1952).
12. Kempkau v. Cathey, 198 Tenn. 17, 277 S.W.2d 392 (1955). See Sanders &
Bowman, Labor Law and Workmen's Compensation-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 VAND.
L. lxv. 1037, 1042-43 (1955).
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A. Injury by Accident
In Combustion Engineering Co. v. Blanks,13 the court affirmed an
award of compensation to an employee whose tuberculosis of the back
was aggravated by his lifting a heavy object at work. The employee
felt a sharp pain at the time, and the tuberculosis was subsequently
discovered. The court held that in view of its decision in Boyd v.
Young,' 4 in which an employee was awarded compensation because
he aggravated a pre-existing cancer by picking up a heavy object, the
injury in the instant case had to be held to be compensable.
One of the principal questions in McKenzie v. Campbell & Dann
Manufacturing Co.15 was whether a post-traumatic neurosis caused by
a compensable injury to an employee's ankle was an injury by acci-
dent within the meaning of the statute.' 6 The court held that a
traumatic or post-traumatic neurosis is one which is occasioned by or
results from an accident to the nervous system and that the employee
had sustained such an injury as the result of the injury to his ankle.
This would appear to be in accord with the uniform rule in such
cases.'
7
B. Injury by Accident Arising Out of Employment
The case of White v. Whiteway Pharmacy, Inc.,18 aptly illustrates the
"arising out of" aspect of the work-connection test in the law of work-
men's compensation. In the White case, the deceased employee was
at her place of employment and engaged in her usual duties when
her estranged husband, a former employee of'the company, came in
and began an argument with her about her seeing other men socially.
The argument became heated, and he stabbed and killed her. The
court held that there was no causal connection between the em-
ployee's employment and her death and that the fact that she was
killed while she was at her place of employment was sheer coin-
cidence. The case is in accord with the universal rule which is, ac-
cording to Professor Larson, that: 'Vhen the animosity or dispute
which culminates in an assault is imported into the employment from
claimant's domestic or private life, the assault does not arise out of
13. 357 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. 1962).
14. 193 Tenn. 272, 246 S.W.2d 10 (1951).
15. 209 Tenn. 475, 354 S.V.2d 440 (1962).
16. The other major question was when compensation for permanent partial disa-
bility should begin. The court held that the employee was entitled to benefits for
temporary disability until such time as the extent of his permanent disability could
be determined. In this connection, see the discussion of Redmond v. McMinn County,
209 Tenn. 463, 354 S.W.2d 435 (1962) at text accompanying notes 50, 51 infra.
17. 1 LAnsoN, WOREMEN's CoaVENsATioN LAW § 42.22 (1952).
18. 360 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1962).
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the employment under any test."19
The dismissal of a widow's suit for workmen's compensation was
affirmed in Knight v. Berkline Corp.20 The health of the plaintiff's
husband had gradually deteriorated over the years to the point that
he was transferred to the job of night watchman, the job at which he
worked until he was discharged. Apparently (the opinion does not
specifically indicate) he died after his employment ceased. Nor does
the opinion indicate the cause of his death. The court did state,
however, that the deceased's physician testified that he was suffering
from arteriosclerosis and cardiac failure and that the deceased's
activities at home would have contributed as much to the acceleration
of his condition as would his night watchman's work. The court held
that there was material evidence that the deceased's death was not
the result of any disease or condition connected with his work, and,
from those facts which can be gleaned from the opinion and surmise
based on the case relied on by the court 21 the case would appear to
have been properly decided.22
The injured employee in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Millet23 was
assisting in installing acoustical tile in a ceiling when dust and other
material fell on exposed portions of her body, causing them to become
irritated and swollen and resulting in contact dermatitis. Thereafter,
she became totally and permanently disabled by panniculitis and
matomyositis. 4 These conditions developed only at the places where
the dermatitis had occurred; prior to the injury, the employee
had been in excellent health. The causes of panniculitis and ma-
tomyositis are unknown, but the employee's personal physician testi-
fied that, in his opinion, her disabling condition resulted from the
contact dermatitis which had continued on into the other conditions.
Other doctors were of the opinion that the dermatitis was unrelated to
the other conditions but admitted that there was medical authority
to support the position that the dust and other substances which had
fallen on her could have caused her condition. The court affirmed
an award of compensation on the ground that it was not mere
19. 1 LAmisoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSAION LAW § 11.21 (1961).
20. 358 S.W.2d 323 (Tenn. 1962).
21. Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed, 209 Tenn. 106, 350 S.W.2d 65 (1961) (employee
suffered injury by accident by virtue of work's causing repeated trauma to a nerve
which resulted in disability).
22. The court also held that because the company had not complied with TENN.
CODE ANN. § 50-1017(2) (1956), the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations
even though it was not filed until four years after deceased's death.
2 3. 358 S.W.2d 316 (Tenn. 1962).
24. According to the court, "Panniculitis is a condition which involves the breaking
out of the fatty tissues of the body, and possibly also the nerve tissues. Derma-
tomyositis involves inflammation and destruction of the muscle tissues of the body.
Both are rare conditions, for which no cure is known." 358 S.W.2d at 317.
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speculation or conjecture to conclude that the panniculitis and
matomyositis were due to the contact dermatitis. In doing so, the
court reiterated that where there is a conflict in medical testimony,
the conflict must be resolved in favor of the employee. The sequence
of events together with the testimony of the employee's personal
physician were sufficient to convince the court of a relationship
between the original accident and the employee's disabling condition.
In arriving at its conclusion, the court also referred to the fact that
in compensation cases in other states, where the medical testimony
was that it would be pure speculation to attribute an injury to a cer-
tain cause, compensation was awarded on the strength of facts
pointing to that cause.25 However, the court found it did not have
to go that far in the instant case. And the case illustrates the ap-
proach that, given medical testimony that an injury could have re-
sulted from the employee's work, the court will find a sufficient
connection between the work and the injury to support an award of
compensation.
The court affirmed a lower court ruling sustaining a demurrer
to a widow's petition for compensation for the death of her husband
in Jones v. H uey.26 The deceased had injured his back in an allegedly
work-connected accident. However, he had not sought workmen's
compensation. Some months after he had left his employment, he
was driving a tractor to bring firewood to his family, allegedly be-
cause he did not have sufficient funds to support them, when he
stepped on the wrong mechanism on the tractor and was killed as a
result. It was alleged that the injury made him unable to operate the
tractor properly and thereby caused his death. The court, in ac-
cordance with precedent, 27 held that the employee's right to compen-
sation ceased when he died and that there was no connection between
his injury and his death sufficient to support an award for his death.
The court stated: "In investigating and reading cases on this question
it will be found that if the injured employee, knowing of his weak-
ness, rashly undertakes to do things likely to result in harm to himself,
the chain of causation is broken by his own negligence. See Yar-
brough v. Polar Ice & Fuel Co., 118 Ind. App. 321, 79 N.E.2d 422."m
The court's decision would appear to be in accord with local prece-
dent2 and the majority rule. 0
25. Citing 2 LASON, WoaKiMN's COMPENSATION LAW § 79.52 (1952).
26. 357 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn, 1962), 30 TENN. L. REv. 322 (1963).
27. Rose v. City of Bristol, 203 Tenn. 629, 315 S.W.2d 237 (1958).
28. 357 S.W.2d at 49.
29. See, e.g., Mallette v. Mercury Outboard Supply Co., 204 Tenn. 438, 321 S.W.2d
816 (1959).
30. For an analysis of cases involving the chain of consequences from the original
injury to the ultimate injury or death, see 1 LARSON, WowcmcN_'s COMPENSATION
19631
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In Huey Brothers Lumber Co. v. Kirk,' the deceased employee
had had a pre-existing condition, a congenital berry aneurysm, which
is a weak spot in. a blood vessel. While using a power saw to cut
wood in the course of his employment he developed a severe head-
ache. He went to a doctor, was operated on, and died. The medical
testimony indicated that the strain of using the power saw would
more likely cause the blood vessel to burst than not, and the court
affirmed a compensation award. In doing so, the court noted its usual
rule that even if ordinary exertion or usual strain at work produces an
unusual result, the resulting injury is by accident and therefore com-
pensable.
The preceding case should be compared with Kellon v. American
Bakeries Co.' In the latter, the employee had a congenital back
defect for which he had received medical treatment. While he was
lifting some trays at work, he felt a sharp pain in his back which
disabled him for several days. He then returned to work but was
discharged approximately a month later. After his discharge, the pain
returned while he was painting. The court found that his congenital
defect would be aggravated by the movement or action which is
ordinarily incident to the normal activities of a normal man and
denied compensation on the ground that there was no evidence that
the employee's work caused the damage to his back. On the basis
of the facts related in the opinion, there can be no quarrel with the
decision.
The employee in Reedy v. Mid-State Baptist Hospital3 had sus-
tained a non-work-connected injury to her back which had partially
disabled her. At work, she again suffered a recurrence of her back
injury and was paid compensation benefits until she was able to
return to work. There was no evidence that she was more disabled
as a result of the recurrence of her injury than she had been, and the
court properly affirmed the lower court's denial of benefits for a
permanent partial disability since her permanent disability was
attributable not to her employment but to her original injury.
C. Injury by Accident in the Course of Employment
In City of Gallatin v. Andersonm the injured employee was a
policeman who was injured by a person he was attempting to arrest.
The policeman had regular duty hours, and the injury occurred out-
side his normal duty hours at a place to which he had gone on a
LAW § 13.00 (1952).
31. 357 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. 1962).
32. 357 S.W.2d 56 (Tenn. 1962).
33. 359 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1962).
34. 209 Tenn. 392, 354 S.W.2d 84 (1962).
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personal mission. He was not in uniform at the time. The person
who caused the injury had committed an offense in the policeman's
presence, and the evidence indicated that all policemen, including
the plaintiff, had been instructed to act in the event an offense was
committed in their presence whether during their normal duty hours
or not. The court affirmed a compensation award since the policeman
was found to have been acting in his official capacity at the time he
was injured. While the facts of the case are somewhat unusual, the
result would appear to be in accord with the usual interpretation
of the requirement that an employee's injury occur in the course of
his employment.
III. ExTENT OF INJURY
The employee in Gluck Bros., Inc. v. Eddington had lost all the
toes on one foot and had been awarded compensation for permanent
partial disability to the body as a whole. He was a day laborer, and
his doctor testified that the employee had also suffered pain and
swelling in the foot and ankle as well as pain in the muscles of the
leg and in his back. The court held that there was material evidence
in the record to support the award based on a finding of an injury
to the body as a whole rather than limiting recovery to the amount
provided in the statute for the loss of the toes. There is ample local
precedent for the court's decision, which is in accord with the
majority rule. 6
A federal district court awarded an employee an increase in com-
pensation benefits in Mitchell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.37 on the basis of a finding of increased disability since the original
award. The employee had been found to have suffered a 50 per cent
permanent partial disability as the result of a heart attack. According
to the instant opinion, two doctors testified at the original trial that
the employee's disability was 100 per cent. At the hearing in the
instant case, the same two doctors testified again, and theirs was
apparently the only evidence considered. One doctor stated that the
employee's disability was the same as it was at the previous trial,
i.e., 100 per cent. The other testified that the employee was totally
disabled, "pointing out indicia of the plaintiff's increased incapac-
ity . . . ."8 The court stated:
It matters not, therefore, that these same physicians testified in the 1958
35. 209 Tenn. 174, 352 S.W.2d 216 (1961).
36. See Sanders & Bowman, Labor Law and Workmen's Compensation-1954 Ten-
nessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. RE:v. 861, 874-75 (1954).




hearing, as well as in the instant hearing, that the plaintiff's disability was,
and is, 100%; Judge Taylor's conclusion that the disability in 1958 was only
50% pretermits the present consideration of that question. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. Rollins (1958), 203 Tenn. 565, 315 S.W.2d 1.
Accordingly, this Court finds that the more recent testimony of the
physicians, when viewed in light of this Court's finding of a 50Y6 disa-
bility in 1958, is tantamount to an increase in the plaintiff's incapacity due
solely to his 1957 injury since the date of the original award.39
In the Reynolds Tobacco case cited by the court, the Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed an award of increased compensation on the
ground that the evidence showed that the employee was in no worse
condition than before. On the basis of that case, the court in the
instant case would appear to be in error in holding that the evidence
showed an increase in disability since the evidence seems to have
indicated that the employee was in the same condition as before.
However, perhaps the holding can be explained on the basis of the
testimony of one of the doctors "pointing out indicia" of increased
disability.
IV. STATUE OF LIMIrATONS
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed a compensation award in
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Baxter 0 even though the
employee did not file his suit for more than a year after he became
disabled. According to the credited evidence, the insurance com-
pany's agent met with the employee to discuss his compensation
claim, and when the employee mentioned that the year from the
accident would soon be reached, the insurance agent told him not to
worry about the statute of limitations. The employee relied on this
and did not bring suit until after the insurance company refused to
pay him benefits, which was more than a year from the date of the
injury. The court held that the insurance company was thereby
estopped to plead the statute of limitations, and the holding would
appear to comport with the majority rule that strict compliance with
notice and claim requirements may be waived by the employer or
the insurer.
4'
In Duplan Corp. v. 'Wilson,2 the court held that an employee's
suit for compensation was not barred by the statute of limitations
when it was brought within a year from the time he became dis-
abled and prevented from working because of an occupational
39. 206 F. Supp. at 489-90.
40. 357 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. 1962).
41. 2 LAnSON, Woaxlvm's COMPENSATION LAW § 78.70 (1952).
42. 358 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1962).
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disease, the disease was diagnosed, and the last compensation benefit
payment from the insurance company had been received.
The court held in General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v.
Kirkland43 that an employer and his insurer are jointly and severably
liable to an employee for work-connected injury" and that the em-
ployee may maintain a suit against the insurer even though a suit
against the employer would be barred by the statute of limitations.
In reaching that result, the court also held that section 28-106 of the
Tennessee Code is applicable to suits under the workmen's compensa-
tion statute. That section provides:
If the action is commenced within the time limited by a rule or statute
of limitation, but the judgment or decree is rendered against the plaintiff
upon any ground not concluding his right of action, or where the judgment
or decree is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and is arrested, or reversed on
appeal, the plaintiff, or his representatives and privies, as the case may be,
may, from time to time, commence a new action within one (1) year after
the reversal or arrest.
In the instant case, the employee had brought suit against the
employer and his insurer. He took a voluntary nonsuit in the suit
against his employer and had received an award against the insurer.
The award against the insurer was subsequently reversed by the
supreme court on technical grounds.4 5 Within a year after that re-
versal, he instituted this suit. However, his rights against his employer
were barred by the statute of limitations because he did not bring
suit against the employer for more than a year after taking the
voluntary nonsuit in the prior case.
In Kimbrell v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit had occasion to construe a provision of Tennes-
see's workmen's compensation statute in a suit under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.47 The plaintiff-employee had been injured in an
automobile accident for which the United States had been found
to be responsible. The employee had received workmen's compensation
from his employer, and more than a year after the accident, he insti-
tuted this action for damages. The United States contended that the
employee could not maintain the action since section 50-914 of the Ten-
nessee Code provides that the failure of an employee who is injured
by a third party in a work-connected accident to bring suit against the
third party within one year from the date of the accident shall con-
43. 356 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. 1962).
44. Citing Collins v. Murray, 164 Tenn. 580, 51 S.W.2d 834 (1932).
45. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Kirkland, 207 Tenn. 72, 338 S.W.2d
549 (1960).
46. 306 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1962).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958).
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stitute an "assignment" to the employer of any cause of action the
employee may have against the third party. Thus, the United States
contended that only the employer or his insurer could maintain the
action. The court of appeals held that the Tennessee legislature, in
using the term "assignment," did not necessarily mean that the em-
ployee lost all right or interest in the cause of action. Rather, it
construed the provision to mean that the employer could institute the
action if the employee had not done so within a year.48
There does not appear to be any controlling Tennessee precedent
on the point, and while the decision is not free from doubt, it is a
liberal construction of the statute for the benefit of the injured
employee. The court stated that the suit was brought with the
consent of the employer, and in such circumstances, it is at least
arguable that the employer thereby impliedly waived his rights or
reassigned the action to the employee. However, as the dissenting
opinion pointed out, there was no evidence of an overt reassignment.
In any event, the Tennessee courts are not bound by the decision.
Nevertheless, if the question arises in Tennessee, the case of Millican
v. Home Stores, Inc.,49 must be considered if there is any tendency to
construe the "assignment" provision in the statute as other than an
assignment giving the employer complete and exclusive control over
the cause of action. In the Millican case, the deceased employee's
widow had settled her claims for his death with the third party for
less than the amount allowable under the compensation statute, and
the court held that the employer was subrogated for the amount of
the settlement only, thereby leaving him liable for the remainder
provided for under the compensation law. If the facts were similar
in another case and a claim against a third party was prosecuted or
settled by the employee or his representative more than a year from
the date of injury, then it would seem that in fairness to the employer,
it should be shown that the action was not being taken over the
objection of the employer, at the very least.
V. COMPUTATION OF BErFiTs
In Redmond v. McMinn Count y,5 the court modified the action of
the lower court, which had credited the amount of compensation
benefits paid an injured employee against the total amount due him
for total permanent disability. The lower court had awarded him the
difference between the two sums on the ground that the employee's
total permanent disability arose at the time of injury. The employee's
48. Citing Keen v. Allison, 166 Tenn. 218, 60 S.W.2d 158 (1933).
49. 197 Tenn. 93, 270 S.W.2d 372 (1954).
50. 209 Tenn. 463, 354 S.V.2d 435 (1962), 30 TENN. L. REv. 326 (1963).
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doctor stated that for a year after the injury, the employee's condi-
tion continued to improve and that the extent of an injury such as
the employee had suffered could not be adequately determined for
at least a year after the injury occurred.
The supreme court pointed out that the statute provides for four
types of disabilities, i.e., temporary total, temporary partial, per-
manent total, and permanent partial. Each type is separately com-
pensated under the statute, and, according to the court, temporary
total disability "refers to the injured employee's condition while dis-
abled to work by his injury and until he recovers as far as the nature
of his injury permits... ."51 Thus, an employee is entitled to benefits
for temporary disability plus whatever benefits he might be entitled
to by virtue of the permanent character of his injury. By so holding,
the court permits an employee to receive more than the statutory
maximum for a permanent total disability.
The holding appears to be in accord with the statutory requirement
that the compensation law be liberally construed and is an indirect
method of increasing the amount of compensation an employee might
receive. However, there is ground for speculation as to the extent of
the practical effect the decision will have since it would seem proba-
ble that the extent of an employee's permanent disability would be
determinable in most cases in a far shorter period than that involved
in the instant case.
51. Id. at 468, 354 S.W.2d at 437.
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